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[L.A. Xo. 27606.

In Bank.

Jan. 30, 1964.]

CONRAD D. ROSEMONT, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent;
CHARLES TURNER et al., Real Parties in Interest.
[1] Depositions-Right to Take.-On defendants' motion to re-

quire plaintiff to produce certain recordings (Code Civ..
Proc., § 2031), the court had jurisdiction to condition plain- :
tiff's right to take defendants' depositions on plaintiff's:
production of the recordings in view of Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 2019, subd. (b), which is made expressly applicable by
§ 2031, and which expressly authorized the court for good
cause to regulate the timing of taking of depositions and .
to make any "order which justice requires to protect the .
party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression."
.
[2a, 2b] Id.-Right to Take.-It was not an abuse of discretion
to condition plaintiff's taking of defendants' depositions on
plaintiff's producing certain recordings where, though defendants' delay in seeking production of the recordings after they
learned of them and their inadequate description of them in
their motion to produce would have justified the court in permitting plaintiff to proceed with taking the depositions without producing, plaintiff himself delayed prosecution of the
action and fairness between the parties justified the court's
action.
[3] Id.-Time When Depositions May Be Taken-Stay.-Even before the 1963 amendment of Code Civ. Proc., § 2019, expressly
authorizing a trial court to stay the taking of a depoliition
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Depositions, §§ 2, 56 j Am.Jur., Depositions
(1st ed § 3 et seq).
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4] Depositions, § 5; [3] Depositions, § 8; [5] Depositions, § 8 j Inspection, § 1; [6} Discovery, § 21(1).
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pending its deeision on a motion for an order which justice
requires to prot('ct the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, it had inherent power to grant
a stay pending its decision.
[4] Id.-Right to Take.-Where defendants had moved for production of certain recordings before they be required to give
depositions and plaintiff had moved that defendants be required to give depositions before he produced the recordings, the court did not abuse its discretion by requiring
plaintiff to provide identifying data concerning the recordings
so that it could rule on the motions.
[5a, 5b] Id.-Time When Deposition May Be Taken: Inspection-Time When Inspection May Be Kad.-Where defendants sought inspection of certain recordings in plaintiff's
possession before the date set for taking defendants' deposition and plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to take defendants' depositions before furnishing the recordings for
inspection, it was not an abuse of discretion to condition
plaintiff's right to take the depositions on his prior production of the recordings, since plaintiff was not seeking merely
the advantages that would flow from the normal timing of
diseovery, but the advantages that would flow from his being
able to refresh his recollection from the recordings before
giving his deposition while denying to defendants equal
opportunity to refresh their recollections from the recordings.
[6] Discovery-Under Statutory Procedures-Discretion of Court.
-A court, in the exercise of its broad discretionary powers,
may alter the normal timing of discovery, but it should not do
so without good reason. The existence of advantnges gained
by the party who first secures discovery ordinarily will not
alone constitute good cause for changing the normal timing
of discovery or justify a conclusion that such timing will
result in "annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression!'

PROCEEDING in prohibition to prevent the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County from enforcing a discovery
order. Philbrick McCoy, Judge. Alternative writ discharged
and peremptory writ denied.
Kindel & Anderson, Ernest J. Zack, Malcolm George Smith
and Bruce W. Sumner for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
McCutchen, Black, Harnagel & Shea, G. William Shea and
William W. Schwarzer for Real Parties in Interest.
TRAYNOR, J.-Pctitioner seeks a writ of prohibition or
other appropriate writ to prevent respondent court from en-
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forcing a discovery order in an action brought by petitioner
as plaintiff against defendants, the real parties in interest
herein.
In October 1960 plaintiff brought an action for damages
against defendant Charles Turner for the breach of an oral
contract alleged to have been entered into in 1957, rt'affirmed
in 1959, and breached on and after July 1, 1960. He also
sought damages from other defendants for inducing breach
of the contract and an accounting by all defl'IHhlllts.
Through new counsel plaintiff filed an amended complaint ill
August 1962. The parties agreed that plaintiff's deposition
should be taken commencing on October 1. He apwared aud
testified for five days. On October 2 the parties stiplllatl,a
that defendant Turner's deposition should be taken on October 24. On October 5 defendants moved for an order pursllant to Code of Civil Proccdure, section 2031 to require plaintiff to produce recordings he had made of cOllYersations ,vith
Turner, other defendants, and employees of other c1pfl'utlants. In tile event tlleir motion for production should be denied, defendants moved in the alternative for a Pl'lltt'l'tive
order pursuant to subdivision (b) (1) of section 2019 of the
Code of Civil Procedure to stay the taking of Turner's deposition pending application for a writ of mandate to require
granting of their motion to produce. In response plaintiff
filed II motion for a protecth-e order to require Turner and
the other witnesses to give their depositions before he produced the recordings he had of conversations with them.
On October 15 the trial court stayed the taking of Turner's deposition pending its ruling on the motions before it.
On December 7 ~he trial court entered an order in which it
stated that defendants' description of the matters sought to
be inspected was inadequate and that on the record before it,
defendants' motion should be denied. It ruled, however, that
"in the interest of conserving the court's time in disposing
of the matter and in order to avoid the necessity for additional discovery proceedings and further motions, it is ordered that within ten days from the date of tltis order plaintiff
will serve and file his own affidavit or declaration, identifying factually and particularly as to dates and parties present, all recordings of (a) conversations between plaintiff
and any defendant or an employee of any defendant, and
(b) of any statements by any d<.>fl"ndant, whether or not
persons other than plaintiff were prrsent at the time of or
parti('ipated in the conversation or }u'Hr<1 the staten1l'l1t . . . .
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Upon the filing of such affidavit or declaration tlle court will
determine defendant's pending motion for an order for in •
. spectioll and plaintiff's pending motion for a protective or·
der." In response to this order, plaintiff filed a declaration
listing by parties and dates 39 conversations he had rl'corded.
Most of these conversations were between plaintiff and Turn·
er, but some were between plaintiff and other defendants or
employees of other defendants. They occurred from Scptem.
ber 8, 1960, to October 31, 1960.
On January 16, 1963, the trial court filed its memorandum
and order setting forth its reasons for concluding tllat before
plaintiff could take the depositions of the parties to the respective conversations, defendants were entitled to inspect
and transcribe the recordings. On March 27, 1963, the court
entered its ord!'r setting forth in detail how its decision of
January 16 should be carried out.
On May 15, 1963 plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of
prohibition or other appropriate writ in the District Court of
Appeal, Second Appellate District, and on June 12, 1963
Division 1 of that court issued an alternative writ of prohibi.
tion. Thereafter it filed its decision granting a peremptory
writ, and this court then granted defendants' petition for
hearing.
Since the District Court of Appeal issued an alternative
writ and the case has been fully briefed on the merits, no
purpose would be served by reconsidering the question
whether the trial court's order was an appropriate one for
review by extraordinary writ. (See Waters v. Sztperior
Court, 58 Ca1.2d 885, 890 [27 Ca1.Rptr. 153, 377 P.2d 265] ;
Oceanside Union School Di,~t. v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.2d
180, 185, fn. 4 [23 Ca1.Rptr. 375, 373 P.2d 439] ; Hagan v.
Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 498, 501-502 [2 Cal.Rptr. 288, 348
P.2d 896].) The lengthy history of this litigation, however,
demonstrates the need for caution in granting intcrim review
of discovery orders, lest the basic purpose of pretrial discovery to expedite litigation be thwarted. (Hagan v. Superior
Court, 57 Ca1.2d 767, 770 [22 Cal.Rptr. 206, 371 P.2d 982].)
In the present case there is no dispute over plaintiff's
right to take the depositions of Turner and other defendants
and defense witnesses before trial. There is no dispute over
defendants' right to secure production of the recorded con·
versations before trial. The only dispute is over the timing of
thesc discovery procedures.
[1] Plaintiff contclldl> that the trial court did not have
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-----------------_._.._-jurisdiction to condition his right to takc (h'positions on hi>!
prior production of the recordings, and that even if it had
jurisdiction to enter the order it did, it abm~ed its discretioh
in doing so.
Subdivision (b) (I) of section 2019,· wllich is made applicable by reference to section 2031, t'xprl'ssly authorizes the \
trial court for good cause to regulate the timing of the taking I
of depositions and to make any "order which justice requires:
to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrass-:
ment, or oppression." Both sides invoked the jurisdiction of
the court to act under these provisions. Defendants sougllt
production of the recordings before the date set for Turner's
deposition or in the altt'rnative a protective order to allow
time to apply for an extraordinary writ. Plaintiff sought a
protective order to delay production until after the depo~I'
tions were taken.
[2a] Plaintiff contends, however, tllat the trial court hnli
power only to grant or deny the motions before it; that it dilt
not have power pending its decision on the motions to stlt,\'
the taking of Turner's deposition or to order plaintiff til
identify the recordings. The Legislature did not I'xpr('s!11r
empower a trial court to stay the taking of 1\ (h'positioll
pending its decision on a motion for a protectivf' ordl'r until
it amended section 2019 in 1963. [3] E,·t'n before th(·
amendment, however, when a stay was nf'('('ssar ...• to I'mthl.· .
the court properly to exercise its jurisdiction to rille on a
-At the time the trial court entered its order, Ruhflh-ision (b) (1) of .
section 2019 provided: "Aft.er notice is served for taking a deposition
by oral examination, upon motion seasoll:lhly mode h~- :lny porty or h~'
the person to be examined and upon notice and for good cnuse shown,
the court in which the action is pending mny mnke nn order that the
deposition shall not be taken, or that it may be taken only at some
designated time or place other than stated in the Doti~f.', or that it shall
not be taken except by allowing written intl'rrogAtories hy one or more
parties, or that certain matters shall not he inquired into, or that the
scope of the examination shall hI' limitetl to ~('rtn;D mattl'rs, or that the
examination shall be held' with no one prl'~l'nt eX~l'l't the po rt;(,A to the
action and their officers or I.'ollnscl, or that after heing seAled the
deposition shall be openf'll olll~- hy orllE'r of thE' ('(llIrt, or that secret
processes, developments, or re~('ar('h ne('d not he disrlo~e<l, or thnt· the
parties shall simultanE'on~I~' file specified (10~\Imt'nt8 or inforlllntion fOndosed in sealed envelopes to he openl'd ns dir(,(·te<l ')y the ronrt: or the
court may make lin,\' olhrr od('r which jttSI1rt' reqllirl'R 10 prot.('rt th('
party or witne~~ from Annoyanl'e, t'mhnrrnssment, or orprl',,~;on. Tn
granting or ref .. ,inlt AII~h orller the (,Ollrt moy iml'o!'e IIron l'ill'N pnrl.'·
or ttpon the \\"iln"R~ the rl.''luirE'ment to pn~' slll'h ~OKt~ :lnd CXl'Cn8cS,
inl.'luding atlnrrH'Y '8 f"CA, aA fh(' <,ourt may dcem reasonalJle."
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motion for a protective order, it llad inherent power to grant
a stay pending its decision. (Code Civ. Proc., § 187.) [4]
Moreover, since pel·mitting the taking of Turner's deposition to proceed would deny defendants an effective ruling on
the timing of the rcspecti\'(~ disrovery proceedings, the trial
court could rPllsonably eonelnoe that the denial of a stay
would in itself constitute" alllloyaner, ell1 barrassment, or oppression," which it is expressly empowered to prevent.
Thereafter, when the court dpterlllillrd that it requirrd more
information, it did not abuse its discretion in ordE'ring tht!
plaintiff to provide thr neerssary identifying date known to
him so that it could pass on the issue before it without setting the matter at large for the making of additional needless
motion..c:; and countermotions.
[5a] Plaintiff contends that the trial court's power to
supervise discovcry procredings dors not include the power
to alter the timing of such proceedings that would normally
follow from the steps taken by each side to secure discovery
against tIle other. He asserts that had tIle time not been
altered, he would have been able to take Turner's deposition
before defendants could have cured their defective motion to
produce and gained access to the recordings.
[6] There is nothing in the statutes, however, that prol1ibits the trial court from altering the normal timing of discovery in the exercise of its broad discretionary powers. Of
course it should not do so without good reason. Since discovery proceedings can seldom if ever be conducted simultaneously, it is inherent in such proceedings that the party who
secures discovery first may derive advantagrs by sreuring
information from his adver!>ary before he is required to reciprocate by divulging information to him. Partirs should be
encouraged to expedite discovery and should not needlessly be
deprived of the advantages that normally flow from prompt
action. Aecordingly, the existence of such advanta:zes aloJh~
will ordinarily not constitute good cause for changing the
normal timing of discovery or justify a conclusion that such
timing will result in "annoyance, embarra!>sment, or oppres!>ion. "
[5b] In the present case, however, plaintiff is not !>('('l,ing
merely the advantages that would flow from thr normn 1 timing of discovery. He is seeking the advantag<'S thnt ,,-oul']
flow from his being able to refrrsh his recollrction from th,~
rrcof(lings hf'fore giving hi!> drpo!>ition whil(' drn~·ing to
Turner and the other parties to those conYer!>ations equal

Jan. 1964]
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opportunity to refresh th!'ir r!'col1!'ctions before giving their
depositions. We held in Dowell v. Supe1'jor Oourt, 47 Ca1.2d
483, 488 [304 P.2d 1009], that a similar attempt to maliC' onesided use of a prior statement of a party was obviollsly inequitable. It is true that the Dowell case dealt with discovery
before trial rather than discovery before giving a deposition,
but since depositions may be introduced at trial against th~
party giving them (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016, subd. (d», the
considerations of fairness underlying the Dowell case apply
here.
Although the trial court was not required to make findings
(Greyhound Oorp. v. Super·jor Oourt, 56 Ca1.2d 355, 384 [15.
Cal.Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266]), it reviewed the record and the
contentions of tIle parties in a carefully reasoned memorandum opinion. [2b] Although defendants' delay ill seeking
production of the records after they lcarn(>d of them and their
inadequate description of them in the motion to produce would
have justified the trial court's permitting plaintiff to proceed
with Turner's deposition before production, plaintiff's own
delay in prosecuting the action and fairness between the parties fully justified the trial court's exercising its discretion
as it did. (Ohalco-Oalifornia Oorp. v. Superior Ooud, 59 Cal.
2d 883, 888 [31 Cal.Rptr. 593, 382 P.2d 865].)
The alternative writ is discharged and tIle peremptory writ
is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek, J., concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent: I would issue the writ of prohibition requested, prohibiting respondent court from giving
effect to its order of March 27, 1963, insofar as it reqnires
production of the recordings prior to the completion and
signing of the deposition of defendant Charles Turner, for
the reasons expressed by the District Court of Appeal in
Rosemont v. Superior Oourt (Cal.App.) 33 Cal.Rptr. 455.
Schauer, J., concurred.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied February 26, 1964. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

-)

